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Motivation – To explore the applicability of a Human Factors methodology for the investigation of 
fratricide.  Research  approach  –  The  EAST  methodology  was  used  to  analyse  an  incident  of 
fratricide  and  its  ability  to  explore  the  Famous  Five  of  Fratricide  (F3)  model  was  investigated. 
Findings/Design – The analysis revealed that EAST was able to provide explicit discussion of the 
Famous  Five  of  Fratricide  (F3)  models  five  causal  factors  of  communication,  cooperation, 
coordination, schemata and situation awareness. Research limitations/Implications – The research 
explored  a  single  case  study  and  as  such  is  couched  at  the  initial  phases  of  investigation. 
Originality/Value – The analysis provides a contribution to the knowledge surrounding fratricide 
both with respect to the novel application of the EAST methodology to an incident of fratricide, and 
also the causal factors identified by EAST within the fratricide incident. Take away message – The 
EAST methodology provides an innovative way of exploring causality in incidents of fratricide. 
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THE INCIDENT 
At the end of the Persian Gulf War a mission called Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) was established. The operation 
was setup as a multinational humanitarian effort for the Kurdish refugees in the Iraqi hills. One aspect of Operation 
Provide Comfort was to develop a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Northern Iraq, also known by the military as the Tactical 
Area Of Responsibility (TAOR). The coalition Air Force led this operation, supported by the Army, who led the ground 
operations in the TAOR. This multinational operation involved American, British, Turkish and French fighter pilots 
who made daily patrols of the TAOR in order to prevent any Iraqi aircraft entering and threatening the humanitarian 
relief efforts (USAF, 1994). Three years after the implementation of the TOAR, on April 15, 1994, two U.S. Army 
Black Hawk (BH) helicopters were shot down by two U.S. Air Force F-15s. All 26 of the Black Hawk passengers were 
killed, including 15 American citizens, and a further 11 consisting of British, French and Turkish military officers and 
Kurdish citizens (USAF, 1994). Both the F15s and the Black Hawks were flown by experienced pilots, with electronic 
identification technology. The incident occurred in clear weather with the support of an AWACS (Airborne Warning 
and Control System) aircraft for surveillance and control of aircraft within the TAOR (USAF, 1994).  
Below a simplified event line of the incident is presented, derived from numerous accounts of the incident, including 
Leveson (2002).  
BH take off
BH enter NFZ and report 
in to enroute controller, 
enroute controller 
annotates BH as friendly 
BH l and at Zakhu – IFF 
and radar returns fade
BH take off and report 
enroute to Arbil to enroute 
controller in code that is 
not understood
BH enter mountainous 
terrain – radar and IFF 
returns fade
F15s enter NFZ and are 
passed to TAOR controller
BH symbology is removed 
from radar scopes as its 
assumed they have landed
F15 lead picks up low 
flying aircraft and reports it 
to AWACS. 
AWACS states clean 
there. 
F15 carry out IFF check –
no response
BH IFF and radar returns 
reappear faintly.
AWACS attempt IFF 
interro – no response.
Labelled as unknown.
F15 report contact again 
AWACS respond with hits 
there. Carry out VID pass 
– ID two Iraqi Hinds
F15 lead instructed wing to 
arm hot, contacted 
AWACS and said 
engaged. F15 carry out 
final IFF check –no 
response 
BHs shot down by 
F15s
 
Figure 1 – Simplified event line of incident 
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THE EAST METHOD 
The Event Analysis for Systemic Teamwork (EAST) (Baber and Stanton, 2004) provides a systems level methodology 
that  explores  emergent  properties  arising  from  the  interactions  within  complex,  multi  agent  systems.  The  EAST 
methodology consists of the integration of seven individual Ergonomics methods. These methods are: Hierarchical Task 
Analysis (HTA: Annett, 2005), Coordination Demand Analysis (CDA: Burke, 2005), Communications Usage Diagram 
(CUD: Watts & Monk, 2000), Social Network Analysis (SNA: Driskall & Mullen 2005), Information Networks (IN: 
e.g. Ogden, 1987) and an enhanced form of Operation Sequence Diagram (OSD: Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992). Through 
the use of multiple methods EAST is able to explore the: who, when, where, what and how of a scenario, as illustrated 
below in Table 1. 
   HTA  CDA  CUD  SNA  Info. Nets.  OSD 
Who                   
When                   
Where                   
What                   
How                   
Table 1 – Methods within EAST methodology 
The use of a conglomerate of seven methods validates  the results  and allows for multiple perspectives within the 
analysis. Such multiple perspectives are needed in order to explore the emergent properties that arise in complex socio 
technical systems. Previous applications of EAST (Walker, Gibson, Stanton, Baber, Salmon and Green, 2006; Salmon, 
Stanton, Walker, Jenkins, Baber and McMaster, 2008) have allowed for a clear illustration of such interplay, depicting 
the information space in which decisions, and interactions between decision makers took place.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Hierarchical Task Analysis 
A Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) describes a scenario using a hierarchy of goals, sub goals and operations. Every 
action undertaken within the scenario is broken down in this manner, beginning with the overall goal of the scenario 
and working down to the individual operations that occurred in order to achieve this goal. An HTA was created for the 
accident scenario. The HTA provides a representation of the tasks, and the task structures involved in the scenario. This 
allows for identification of task errors within the scenarios and subsequently identifies possible causal factors in the 
fratricide incident. The HTA also feeds into many other aspects of the EAST analysis. 
Coordination Demands Analysis 
Using the HTA as an input, Coordination Demands Analysis (CDA); (Burke, 2005) can be carried out on the accident 
scenario. Within any scenario involving teams there are a mixture of team work (tasks that require coordination with 
others) and task work (tasks that can be performed in isolation) tasks to be undertaken. CDA allows for the division and 
comparison of these task types. Tasks are extracted from the HTA and rated as either task work tasks or team work 
tasks. As illustrated in Figure 2 below, the analysis revealed higher levels of teamwork tasks (61%) than task work tasks 










Accident Scenario 61% 39%
Team Task
 
Figure 2 – Team and task work ratios 
In this way we can quantitatively measure the level of teamwork that occurred within an accident scenario. Higher 
levels of teamwork would be hypothesized to act as a preventative measure for fratricide. A high level of task work 
tasks in the actual scenario may also act as a causal factor in incidents of fratricide. Literature suggests that if the level 
of work, either task work or team work, becomes too high the workload level may have a negative impact upon the 
team’s performance (Urban, Bowers, Monday &Morgan, 1995). 
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The next stage of the CDA involves the application of a taxonomy containing communication, situation awareness, 
decision making, mission analysis, leadership, adaptability and assertiveness. This taxonomy is applied to each task step 
judged to be a teamwork task in the HTA and rated as low, medium or high (1 -3). From the application of this 
taxonomy a total coordination score can be derived from the mean of the component scores. The scores can be seen 
















Figure 3 – CDA Analysis  
Based  upon  literature  surrounding  faulty  decision  making  and  resultant  accidents  (Wiegmann  and  Shappell,  2001; 
Reason,  1990)  it  may  be  assumed  that  incidents  of  fratricide  would  occur  within  systems  with  low  levels  of 
coordination  activities.  The  results  of  the  CDA  analysis  allow  this  idea  to  be  explored.  Overall,  the  mean  total 
coordination score for the accident scenario is 1.9 (out of a maximum of three). From this it is posited that low levels of 
coordinated  activity  may  be  a  causal  factor  of  fratricide.  The  CDA  analysis  is  able  to  provide  an  exploration  of 
coordination.  Through  the  methodology  quantitative  measurements  of  coordination  can  be  derived  allowing  for 
statistical  comparisons  between  teams  or  even  between  scenarios  for  coordination.  In  this  case  low  levels  of 
coordination are posited to be a causal factor in incidents of fratricide.  
Social Network Analysis 
Social  network  analysis  enables  the  representation  of  the  communication  links  between  agents  in  a  scenario.  The 
advantage of the network approach is that it focuses on the relationships among agents within their social context 
(Gibson, Walker, Stanton and Baber, 2004). A social network matrix was developed for the scenario containing all 
communications that occurred between all agents within the scenario. From this matrix the social network diagram 
below, Figure 4, can be developed.  
 
Figure 4 – SNA of actual scenario  
Examination of the social network reveals the social organisation in the accident scenario. The network appears to be 
quite convoluted with many actors having links to many other actors and fewer key, or central, actors with fewer, 
stronger links. From this we can surmise that the accident scenario is quite distributed with a high number of weak 
communication links. This provides interesting information about the structure of the system. 
Once the social network has been created a number of statistics can be derived from it using graph theory (Driskell and 
Mullen, 2005). These statistics include: 
•  Sociometric status (represents the  contribution an  individual makes  to overall  communication activity,  the 
connectedness (i.e. number of connections to other nodes) of a particular information element). 
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•  Cohesion (the degree of cohesive bonds – direct connections - between actors) 
Sociometric status 
The  greater  the  number  of  sociometric  status  an  agent  has  the  greater  the  contribution  an  agent  makes  to  the 
communication flow of the network. Figure 5, below illustrates the sociometric status levels for all actors involved in 

























BH Lead BH Trail  JOIC Total
 
Figure 5 – Social network sociometric status 
In this way EAST is able to illustrate the individual actors, and the overall systems level of sociometric status, or the 
level  of  contribution  to  communication.  From  this  we  can  discuss  differences  in  communication  between  actors, 
between teams and between scenarios. 
Cohesion  
The cohesion metric provides a quantitative measurement of cohesion (another name for cooperation). Within social 
network analysis cohesion refers to dense ties between members of a network, for example, actor A and B are both 
linked to actor C, as well as to each other. The cohesion metric for the entire scenario was calculated to be 0.10256. In 
this way the social network analysis  a quantitative measure of cooperation can be derived,  allowing for statistical 
comparison between teams and between scenarios.  
Communication Usage Diagram 
A  Communication  Usage  Diagram  was  developed  for  the  accident  scenario.  This  involved  identifying  all 
communication that occurred during the scenario, from the HTA and other accounts of the incident, and the means 
through which this communication occurred. The analysis showed that all communication that was through either radio 
contact, was face to face, or was in paper format. A summary of the CUD results for the scenario are illustrated below 








Accident Scenario 17 12 12 41
Radio Face to Face Paper Total
 
Figure 11 – Summary of ideal and actual scenario CUD 
In this way the CUD analysis allows for the identification of the total number of communication acts within an accident 
scenario.  The  communication  usage  diagram  allows  for  a  quantitative  figure  to  be  placed  on  the  communication 
occurring within any given scenario, enabling a statistical comparison of communication between teams and between 
scenarios.  
Information Networks 
The EAST methodology involves the construction of Information Networks which in this analysis were formed through 
close  examination  of  the  accident  report  transcript  and  from  the  HTA  developed  earlier  in  the  EAST  analysis. 
Information Networks consist of a set of nodes that represent information related to the scenario; sources of information 
and  agents.  These  information  objects  are  linked  together  through  causal  pathways,  for  example,  the  object 
[preparation] has the property of [briefing] associated with it, and the object [briefing] has the property of [ATO] 
associated with it, and so forth, see Figure 13 below.  
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Figure 136 – Example extract from knowledge network  
Information Networks allow for the exploration of two of the Famous Five of Fratricide models causal factors: situation 
awareness  and  schemata.  These  concepts  are  tightly  coupled  with  one  another.  Neisser’s  (1976)  concept  of  the 
perceptual - action cycle clearly illustrates the way in which schema and situation awareness are intertwined. Neisser 
hypothesises  that  individuals  hold  anticipatory  schema  which  direct  their  attention  in  any  given  situation.  The 
individual then interacts with the world and gains situation awareness, based upon these anticipatory schema. The 
situation  awareness  then  acts  to  modify  the  individuals  schema  based  upon  this  interaction  with  the  world.  This 
modified schema then guides further interaction with the world, which again causes modification of the schema, and so 
forth in this cyclical manner. Every person’s schema will be different based upon their differing life experiences. As we 
use schemata to drive our information processing they have a huge impact upon which information we process and the 
way in which we interpret this information. Two people can receive the same information yet process it in entirely 
different ways due to their differing schemata.  
The genotype phenotype distinction (Stanton et al, 2008) presents a useful way of distinguishing between schemata and 
situation awareness. Genotype (schema) refers to wider systemic factors that influence the development of individual 
cognitive phenomena and behaviour. Phenotype refers to the local, individual specific manifestation of cognition and 
behaviour (situation awareness). Schemata represent a generic enduring model of the world that sets expectations and 
guides search for information, whereas situation awareness represents a more transient, moment by moment flow of 
current information.  
Situation awareness 
The  overall  information  network  for  the  accident  scenario  represents  the  systems  situation  awareness.  In  order  to 
explore the development of situation awareness and schemata throughout the scenario, the scenario can be broken down 
into phases. In this case it has been broken down into eleven distinct phases based upon the event line created earlier. 
Information Networks have been derived for each of these eleven phases. The present discussion will focus upon the 
key information objects identified. Graph theory metrics, as used in the social network analysis, were employed in order 
to identify the key information objects as identified as those with a value of the mean + one standard deviation.  
Below Table 2 contains a summary of the key information objects used in each phase of the accident scenario.  
Information Objects  08.22  09.21  09.27  09.54  10.12  10.15  10.20  10.21  10.22  10.24  10.25 
Summarised ROE                                  
Army Ops Prep                                  
AWACS mission                                  
ATO                                  
Air Ops Prep                                  
F15 mission                                  
Air Ops                                  
ACO                                  
Army Ops                                  
SITREP                                  
BH mission                                  
ENROUTE IFF mode                                  
ENROUTE radio freq.                                  
AWACS tracking                                  
F15 report contact                                  
Table 2 –Key information objects 
Table  2  illustrates  the  development  of  situational  awareness  throughout  the  scenario.  The  majority  of  the  key 
information objects remained stable throughout the accident scenario. The information objects AWACS tracking, En-
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route IFF mode and En-route radio freq. were only key information objects during the phases of the scenario in which 
AWACS were actively tracking the Black Hawk helicopters, who were using the En-route IFF and radio freq. The table 
also highlights the lack of BH mission as a key knowledge object before the Black Hawks entered the TAOR at 09:21. 
This leads to the assumption the knowledge of the Black Hawk mission was not disseminated throughout the system 
before the Black Hawks entered the TAOR. 
Individual and team situation awareness 
In order to explore these differences more fully the Information Networks can be broken down to represent individual 
actors’ situation awareness within the scenario. Figure 15 below, illustrates the initial knowledge network (8:22) for the 
accident scenario. This network has been colour coded with respect to the activation of each information element by 
each actor. Each actor is assigned a colour and the network is coloured to illustrate, put simply, who knows what.  
 
Figure 15 – 8.22 Information Network. 
The ability to derive each individual actor’s Information Networks allows us to compare the situation awareness of 
individual  members,  and  of  teams  with  one  another,  in  the  same  way  as  we  explore  the  system  level  situation 
awareness. This allows for quantitative measures (for example, sociometric status for key information objects) to be 
derived and compared across a variety of systemic levels and scenarios. In this way EAST not only explores situation 
awareness,  it  explores  situation  awareness  across  systemic  levels  and  provides  quantitative  measures  to  allow  for 
statistical comparison.  
Schemata 
From the identification of individual actors situation awareness an examination of individual actor’s schemata can be 
undertaken. If we focus upon the F15 pilots information elements [those in blue] it can be seen that the pilots were 
aware that there may be a Black Hawk flight that day, but that all other information they received led them to believe 
that at the time they were in the TAOR, no other friendly aircraft were. The schema held by the F15 pilots of no friendly 
aircraft in the area was developed due to the OPC policy that no aircraft were allowed to enter TAOR before the F15 
sweep. The OPC policy that no aircraft were allowed to enter without AWACS coverage also meant that when AWACS 
said they had no information updates for the F15s, the F15s assumed  this meant there were no updates regarding 
friendly forces in the area. In addition to this the daily flight schedule; the F15 briefing; AWACS no contacts there 
report; AWACS unknown contact their report; IFF interrogation lack of response; incorrect VID pass due to additional 
fuel tanks all served to reinforce the schema of no friendly aircraft in area. The schema has now been reinforced 
several times in a short time period, it is now a strong schema and would require substantial negative confirmation to 
break  or  change  it.  This  direct  negative  confirmation  did  not  occur  and  the  schema  was  maintained,  all  future 
information served to reinforce the initial schema of no friendly forces in the area. At each of these points within the 
scenario the F15 pilots were predisposed to believe that the contact was enemy, that there were no friendly aircraft in 
the  area,  and  at  each  of  these  points  the  predisposition  was  strengthened.    It  is  this  way  that  individual  actors 
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   F15  AWACS  BH 
No friendly aircraft in the area          
F15- F16  rivalry         
Helicopters don’t fly into TAOR         
IFF returns drop means helicopters landed          
AWACS tracking of helicopters        
Appropriate radio freq.          
Appropriate IFF mode         
ROE         
VID of Black Hawk helicopter          
Table 3 – Key schemata.  
Table 3 above highlights the key schemata for the accident scenario. Woods et al (1994) highlight the importance of the 
activation of knowledge. It is not enough to have knowledge in a system, people must be aware of this knowledge, it 
must be activated. EAST is able to not only illustrate the knowledge within a system, but through its Information 
Networks it is able to identify which information objects are activated and by whom. EAST enables the analyst to go 
even further and identify possible reasons for the activation of information objects through its exploration of schemata. 
Metrics such as sociometric status allow for the comparison of key information objects and situation awareness between 
individuals, teams and even systems. This allows for identification of schema and information that may have acted as 
causal factors within incidents of fratricide. Such analysis enables thorough exploration of two of the five causal factors 
from the Famous Five of Fratricide model.  
Operation Sequence Diagram  
The Operation Sequence Diagram (OSD) presents a graphical illustration of the sequence of events that occurred, who 
was involved in the incident and the time at which it occurred. The OSD provides a useful graphical representation of a 
summary of the results of the HTA, CDA, CUD and SNA. Unfortunately the OSD for this scenario is too large to be 
incorporated into  the  main body of this paper.  Table 4 below represents operations  loading table for the  accident 
scenario, one aspect of the OSD.  
   Operation  Transmit  Receive  Request  Total 
Total  62  161  161  2  386 
Table 4 – Operations Loading Table  
The operation loading table provides a quantitative measure of the amount of communication operations (in comparison 
to the total number of operations) that occurred during any given scenario. In this case we can see that receive and 
transmit (communication operations) account for a large amount of the total operations occurring. Within the accident 
scenario communication accounts for 322 of the 386 operations that occurred. The OSD loading table provides us with 
a further quantitative measurement of communication that can be used to statistically compare communication between 
teams and scenarios in order to provide a fuller exploration of one of the Famous Five of Fratricide models causal 
factors.  
 
Famous Five  EAST method 
Communication  Social Network Analysis 
  Communication Usage Diagram 




Cooperation  Social Network Analysis 
 Schema  Generic Information Networks 
Situation Awareness  Specific Information Networks 
Table 5 – EAST methods and Famous Five 
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CONCLUSION  
Previous work by the author has identified the need for a complex systemic method for exploration of incidents of 
fratricide, and to validate the Famous Five of Fratricide model. The EAST methodology was applied to an incident of 
fratricide in order to ascertain its ability to analyse incidents of fratricide and to validate the Famous Five of Fratricide 
model.  The  application  of  EAST  enabled  data  to  be  inputted  into  each  section  of  the  model:  communication, 
cooperation, coordination, schemata and situation awareness. 
EAST is able, not only, to provide a discussion of all of the Famous Five of Fratricide models causal factors, but is also 
able to provide quantitative measurements of these factors. This enables statistical comparison of the causal factors 
between teams and between scenarios and enables a greater depth of exploration of the causal factors behind teamwork 
breakdowns, specifically here for the investigation of fratricide.  
In conclusion, the application of the EAST methodology to an incident of fratricide provided a complex and systemic 
method that was able to explore the accident scenario thoroughly. The methodology addressed each of the causal factors 
present within the Famous Five of Fratricide model thus provides a new methodology for the analysis of fratricide 
incidents and a way in which to validate and build upon the model.   
 
REFERENCES 
Annett,  J.  (2005).  Hierarchical  task  analysis.  In  N.  A.  Stanton  et  al.  (Eds),  Handbook  of  Human  Factors  and 
Ergonomics Methods (pp. 33.1-33.7). London: CRC. 
Baber,  C.  and  Stanton,  N.A.  (2004)  Methodology  for  DTC-HFI  WP1  field  trials.  Defence  Technology  Centre  for 
Human Factors Integration. Report 2.1. 
Burke, S. C. (2005). Team Task Analysis. In N. A. Stanton et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Methods (pp. 56.1-56.8). London: CRC.  
Driskell, J. E., & Mullen, B. (2005). Social Network Analysis. In N. A. Stanton et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Methods (pp. 58.1-58.6). London:CRC. 
Gibson, H., Walker, G., Stanton, N. And Baber, C. (2004). Report on Results of EAST Methodology for Railway Data: 
Possession Scenario. HFIDTC/WP1.1.3/7. Version 1.  
Kirwan, B. And Ainsworth, L.K. (1992). A guide to Task Analysis. London: Taylor and Francis. 
Leveson, N.  (2002). A New Approach to System Safety Engineering. Cambridge, MA: Aeronautics and Astronautics, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and Reality. San Francisco: Freeman. 
Ogden, G.C. (1987). Concept, knowledge and thought. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 203 – 227. 
Salmon, P.M., Stanton, N.A, Walker, G.H., Jenkins, D.P., Baber, C. and McMaster, R. (2008) Representing situation 
awareness in collaborative systems: A case study in the energy distribution domain. Ergonomics. 51: 3, 367-384. 
Stanton, N. A., Salmon, P. M., Walker, G. H. and Jenkins, D. (2009)’Genotype and phenotype schemata and their role 
in distributed situation awareness in collaborative systems’. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science,10:1,43 — 68 
Urban, J.M., Bowers, C.A., Monday, S.D. and Morgan Jr, B.B. (1995).Workload, Team Structure, and Communication 
in Team Performance. Military Psychology, 7(2), 123-139. 
Walker, G.H., Gibson, H., Stanton, N.A., Baber, C., Salmon, P. and Green, D. (2006). Event analysis of systemic 
teamwork (EAST): a novel integration of ergonomics methods to analyse C4i activity. Ergonomics,49:12,1345 — 
1369. 
Watts, L.A. and Monk, A.F. (2000). Reasoning about tasks, activities and technology to support collaboration. In Task 
Analysis, J. Annett and N. Stanton (Eds.), pp 55-78 (London: Taylor and Francis). 
Wiegmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (2001). Human error analysis of commercial aviation accidents: Application of the 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 72, 
1006–1016. 
USAF Aircraft Accident Investigation Board. U.S. Army Black Hawk Helicopters 87-26000 and 88-26060: Volume 1, 
Executive  Summary:  UH-60  Black  Hawk  Helicopter  Accident,  14  April  1994.  Available  from 
www.schwabhall.com/opc report.htm. 
377